By John and Helen Steward, editors Hyman
This number of unique essays by means of major philosophers covers the total variety of the philosophy of motion.
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Extra resources for Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; 55)
Why suppose otherwise? This is the issue which the present paper is about. In pursuing it, I will take it as granted for present purposes that I am right in the account I give of the reasons for which agents act. Normative explanations give the agent's reasons for doing what she did, and they are the only explanations that do this. Causal explanations, then, whatever their form, will not be attempting to do this as well. For if they do, we will most probably have two competing accounts of the agent's reasons, and this is exactly what we are not supposing when we entertain the possibility that the normative explanation be supplemented in some way by a causal explanation.
4. The explanation is normative because it specifies something that the agent took to be a reason—that is, because it appeals to a normative belief of the agent's. ) 5. The explanation is normative because someone who wields it is displaying a capacity to distinguish between those things that are comprehensibly taken to be goods and those that are not, or because it appeals to normative laws. This last one, which we have reached by a process of gradual elimination, seems to me to be defensible, indeed to be correct.
If so, we would have established that defenders of C are implicitly committed to an account of agents' reasons that is in competition with that of the normative explanation. But it may not be so. s For this to be the case, each intentional action stands in two distinct relations, one to the believings in the light of which the agent acts, and one to the things believed which are the reasons for which he acts. And there are distinct normative principles requiring our actions to stand in both those relations at once.
Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; 55) by John and Helen Steward, editors Hyman